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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PEACE OPERATIONS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEF PROKS
Army of the Czech Republic

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

LTC Josef Proks Army of the Czech Republic

COL James F. Powers, Jr. Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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Josef Proks

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Peace operations are more and more important in the contemporary world. The end of the Cold War increased not only possibilities of solving disputes by the international community but also by the number and diversity of threats and issues. It calls for new solutions and broad theoretical and practical work in this field. The world is developing trends in new relations in a new environment with new problems. It is our obligation to be ready to solve these future tasks. Peace operations are one part of these tasks.

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PREFACE

| UN | United Nations |
|----|------------------|
| PO | Peace Operations |
| MF | Military Forces |
| PK | Peace Keeping |
| PM | Peace Making |
| | |

MOOTW

Military Operations Other Than War Peace Keeping Operations Peace Making Operations PKO PMO Dayton Agreement DA Implement Force Stabilization Force **IFOR SFOR** ROE Rules of Engagement

IPTF International Police Task Force

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PEACE OPERATIONS

The wish to protect peace and security is as old a mankind. States establish their military forces for these reasons. But they served only restricted goals.

Military forces have been created in order to protect the state's interests. The military today has been built under the same principles. Military forces are only for national defense, for the preservation of sovereignty and to maintain the independence of the country. Therefore the forces have served for preservation of peace but only for the state, which established and maintained them. Thus the armies have been built, above all, to protect the individual state's interests. They have been organized, armed, equipped and trained with this in mind. However, this is not in keeping with their new task. There is a need to have an army not just for defense and attack.

States later began to create pacts with other states to join their military capabilities. But this advantage was only for members of these coalitions and could be abused. The example is World War I. Alliances as a tool of peace collapsed and resulted in World War I. Collective security doesn't mean just creating alliances.

The idea of collective security is not new. The first organization that tried to solve security problems was established as a result of World War I. It had a peculiar name – The League of Nations. Unfortunately even this organization did not solve security problems. The weaknesses of this organization were shown before the outbreak of World War II. the league had neither the power nor the tools to influence its own members. The result was obvious: the outbreak of World War II and the collapse of this organization.

After World War II the United Nations was established because of the need for peace and security. The United Nations used the League's experiences and has developed and perfected the concept. Generally the UN's activities can be divided into two phases. The first was during the Cold War, the second period has been after Cold War. These two periods are differentiated by how broad and deep problems were solved and by the international environment in which UN worked. In the PKO sphere:

Phase I:

1940 - 80 - PK concept developed and practiced

Phase II:

1988 - 92 - PK concept expanded1

The first period was during a bipolar world. Ideology had strong influence on all movements in the world and superpowers effected all main affairs. In fact, the UN's position was weaker than the superpowers' positions. The UN was not able to solve problems without the superpowers' consensus. The result was only 13 PO during the period from 1947 until 1985.²

The environment was changed in the period after the Cold War.

MILITARY AFTER COLD WAR

CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR

The world was changed from a bipolar to a multi-centric world. With these changes arose new problems and questions:

- 1. What is the present character of military threats, given the shift from a bipolar to a multicentric world, and to what degree does the current threat situation represent a radical break from the past?
- 2. How will the absence of a focal *enemy* affect military organization and how will it affect the professional self-conception and the political and social standing of military elite who lead the armed forces of advanced industrial states?
- 3. How will the multi-centric world order affect participation by national armed forces in multinational PK organizations?³

The end of the Cold War brought a new environment of international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in some new negatives: less control over nuclear arsenals, less control over strong and huge military forces, economical and political instability, collapse of regional markets and the surfacing of new regional powers. It means new potential threats and conflicts. Open borders resulted in international crime and narcotic gangs. The world market has had more and more international character. Non-military threats have had a more important role.

Now many international problems should be solved by the UN. But it was not ready to solve new problems. Suddenly there were new demands on it. The UN was overcommitted by a number of new questionable situations. It was necessary to change UN as an organization.

The UN passed through huge transitions, and became a different organization. The UN has extended influence. It has used not only PKO but also PMO, peace enforcement and post conflict peace building and other kinds of PO. The forces are used without disputant ratification now. Coercive peacemaking are forcible actions, to impose peace between unwilling belligerents.⁴

Consequently political and theoretical gaps developed such as our understanding of military operations other than war. What terms does PO include and what does each term mean?

For planning and for the international decision making process it is helpful for everyone to state clearly what they want to achieve and to build. It is necessary to clearly determine national interests and national policy for new threatens and for new types of MOOTW. For intrastate reasons, how does the MF build for new tasks. This is based on the state's values.

This determination is defined by the US government:

- 1. We will need special operations forces for insertion into volatile situations (the Liberian rescue of 1991) or in support of counterinsurgency efforts (El Salvador).
- 2. We will require highly mobile, rapidly deployable airborne, ranger and marine contingents for quick insertion into relatively short contingency operations (Operation Just Cause in Panama).

- 3. We will need highly mobile and capable air and sea forces. These will be useful for assisting others by establishing air or sea superiority, for rapidly deploying our own or UN PM forces into third world contingencies, or simply for shows of force.
- 4. We will need units trained in military police-like tactics for use in future actions like Somalia; other roles and mission will have to be otherwise justified.⁵

WHEN TO USE THE MILITARY FORCES - GENERAL

We use MF as a tool for fulfilling political interests and goals. Thus when and how is it proper to use MF? At first we can use the classic military thought: "Force could be used in extraordinary circumstances." – Machiavelli. This should be the first rule. Different statesmen have different ideas about applying MF.

Former secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed the following six criteria to determine the conditions under which the use of military force was warranted:

- The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies...
- If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning...
- If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives...
- The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size,
 composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary...
- Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress...
- The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.⁶

General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the military view of four propositions when it is appropriate to use force:

- Force should be used only as a last resort...
- Military force should be used only when there is a clear- cut military objective...
- Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved.
- Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion⁷.

President Bush described at least four principles that should influence the decision to use military force:

- The relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less vital...
- Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force
 can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can
 be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and
 sacrifice.
- A desire for international support is not a prerequisite for acting, although acting in concert with allies and friends is preferred....
- It will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces once the mission is completed.⁸

A new-world order, regardless of its form, brings with it a new order of crises. These crises do not have to escalate into war. Here is new spectrum of uses of MF. We can not suffice only with peace keeping operations. New problems call for new solutions. We have to develop new types of military operations - military operations other than war. To develop MOOTW, we can use one state MF, alliance MF, coalition MF or combination of these possibilities. For using MF in MOOTW there have to be special opportunities and conditions. We have enough experience from traditional PKO to evaluate them and generalize conditions for their success. The first step is to define the conditions that are necessary for success in traditional PKO:

- the international community (the UN and/or regional organization) believes the conflict justifies intervention, and is willing to take the risk of introducing military forces and to bear the cost
- a plausible political settlement to the dispute exists and could be defined in general terms
- the parties to the conflict are prepared to stop fighting and to accept outside help in moving toward a political settlement in traditional PO
- the international community is essentially neutral as to how the dispute should be resolved,
 and this is apparent to the warring parties
- MF have a role that is relevant to achieving to political settlement, e.g., a truce monitors, patrols in demilitarized zones, etc.⁹

In those situations that meet all the conditions like those of past successful peacekeeping operations, many difficulties will arise. But these are politically manageable, because they will not pose high costs in terms of lives or resources. What is needed is the international community's willingness to set priorities, to provide the financial support, and to put in place the necessary organizational arrangements. The support of United Nations is necessary. The peace operation must be approved by the Security Council of United Nation Organization. Fulfillment of this condition gives the action

legitimacy. Nobody can impure the action of military forces as an encroachment into the interior affairs of the state. This condition is valid all the time. The same rules are valid either in a joint operation or if it is a one state operation.

For such conflicts, the international community's response should involve some or all of the measures below, including the potential threat and use of military forces:

- uphold the principle of peaceful changes in boundaries, and the principle of no enforced movement of people
- take steps to protect human rights and provide political autonomy and safeguard for the rights of minority groups
- seek to build confidence among the parties in dispute thorough cooperative security measures,
 demilitarized zones, and mutual constraints on the size and activities of military forces
- set up institutional mechanisms, regionally and internationally, for preventing conflicts and providing the means for their resolution; the Crises Center has taken such steps, including establishing a Conflict Prevention Center and a Crises Center High Commission for Minorities
- provide international guarantees of minority rights and possible security guarantees backed up with military forces
- if all this fails, introduce military forces simply to control the violence and prevent human suffering, with the knowledge that the prospects for political settlement are remote or may not exist¹⁰

These are only general conditions that we must consider carefully before we use military forces. MOOTW are not historically typical operations for military forces. Unfortunately we do not have another tool to solve new crises. We have to transform contemporary MF and transform our thinking and consideration for their use in new-world circumstances.

WHAT PEACE OPERATIONS INCLUDE - CLASSIFICATION

For understanding these problems we have to have and use comprehensible and integrated terminology. After the Cold War arose new broad possibilities for using military forces. Each organization created its own terminology and the same term does not mean the same thing. Because PO usually have international character, we have to use this integrated terminology.

They are, in turn, organized in three levels of increasing military organization and capability:

level one - monitors and supervision

level two - reinforced military presence

level three – military intervention¹¹

On 10th of December, 1993 – The Institute of Public Policy of George Mason University answered the question – "The Policy Implications of Command and Control in Multinational Peace Support Operations"

They classified missions by different, but nevertheless logical, measurements.

Types of Missions:

- Pure PK
- Observation
- Preventive Deployment
- Internal conflict resolution
- Assistance to Interim Governments
- Protection of Humanitarian goals
- Guarantee and Denial of Movement
- Sanctions and Embargoes
- High Intensity Operations
- Hybrids and combinations¹²

The US MF use another term - Military Operations Other Than War – MOOTW. This term is broader and includes more kinds of operations.

Types of missions according to Joint Pub 3-07:

- Arms Control
- Combating Terrorism
- DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations
- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations
- Enforcing Exclusive Zones
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Military Support to Civil Authorities
- Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Peace Operations
- Protection of Shipping
- Recovery Operations
- Show of Force Operations
- Strikes and Raids
- Support to Insurgency¹³

Nevertheless PO's include various operations. They are designed to either establish or support peace, despite the fact that we call only some operations "Peace Operations" in special terminology. No one official directive document has determined and described PO as an international norm. I will concentrate only on this kind of Military Operations Other Than War.

Peace Operations or Peace Support Operations contained traditional peacekeeping operations and functional alternatives to traditional UN PKO. These are peace enforcement operations, peace making operations, peace building operations and preventive diplomacy. Under the term Peace Operations we include these kinds of operations:

Peacekeeping operations - are military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce or cease-fire and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.

Traditional peacekeeping operations have been normally dispatched under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. For example: Emergency Force I and II- PKO in the Near East region, UN Operation in the Congo, Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Interim Force in Lebanon, and the Multinational Force - PKO operation between Syria and Israel.

Peacekeeping forces are relatively small and cannot create the conditions for their own success. These forces are dependent on the consent of the local parties. But they are developed not to establish peace between disputants but to create conditions for negotiation or the realization of a peace agreement. PKO force cannot coerce local parties and when war is renewed, peace forces should be withdrawal. PK today is a term applied to a wide range of activities, including:

- stabilization of war zones
- preventive military deployments
- monitoring of elections
- humanitarian aid
- maintenance of civil order

- monitoring and supervision of cease-fire
- disarming of forces
- administering transmissions to new governments
- disaster relief

Peace enforcement operations - are actions using military force or the threat of its use, according to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. This can include dealing with interstate conflicts and with internal intra-state conflicts where state institutions have largely collapsed. Peace enforcement forces generally must have clear enough superiority over combined local forces to be able to use coercive means to suppress conflict, thereby establishing a de facto cease fire, or to protect non-combatant populations in a failed or failing state. Peace enforcement may also be used to maintain a cease fire or, as in the case of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to implement a peace accord in a particularly unstable area where fighting may break out at local levels. Finally, peace enforcement operations may be necessary in humanitarian intervention if a situation erodes to the point where coercive force is necessary to protect medical and food supplies and/or civilians.

Peacemaking - diplomatic initiatives using mediation, conciliation and arbitration to peacefully resolve a conflict and bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement, essentially through peaceful means foreseen under Chapter VI, of the UN Charter, as we have seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Peace building - post-conflict action that strengthens and rebuilds civil institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conductive to peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict, as we are witnessing in Cambodia and Somalia.

We cannot forget preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic efforts can prevent a crisis and exclude the use of MF in any form.

Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis and aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs.

Another analysis can use different classifications and different terminology. For example "tripwire", "naval PK", etc.

APPROVAL OF PEACE OPERATIONS

UNITED NATIONS POSITION

Why does the UN exist? The UN is a part of the international system which supports the system of international law and interdependent economic relationship. The UN was founded in October 1945. It had 51 members. Now the UN has 194 members. In the period of its existence there have been 150 wars in which 150 million people died. The role of the UN changed with the end of the Cold War. The UN is now in a new and different position and situation. The fundamental question will be whether the nations of the world will be able to deal with, and respond to, the multiple and varied problems of the future. The obligation of the UN is to keep international order and peace. Today 16 million refugees and 25 million people live in different countries because of conflict. In 1993 17 PO took place. This means 80 thousand soldiers in 19 countries: expenditures were 3.6 billion US Dollars per year. The content and scope of PO have extended. What power and tools does the UN have for this task?

The UN should have to approve all PO. PO that are approved by the UN are legitimate, morally justifiable and joint efforts of countries. The Security Council can authorize but not mandate PO or military action. The Security Council can designate a single country, a group of countries or a regional organization to organize, plan and direct authorized collective action. The UN does not have its own military forces.

The UN has to solve a new problem: humanitarian intervention versus state sovereignty. But a few examples have given rise to questions about concepts of sovereignty and whether the international community has the duty to intervene to halt such atrocities. In June 1992 the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said: "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed." That means that humanitarian intervention is possible and justifiable. Humanitarian intervention is: "The threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent country, or an international organization, with the object of

protecting humanitarian rights." ¹⁶ But justification for Humanitarian Intervention is an extraordinarily sensitive problem.

Each state has the right to determine justice for itself, for its own people, and within its own borders. States do not have a right to impose their concept of justice on others. Collective security was designed to provide an enforcement mechanism for the law. Collective security was based not on a balance of power but on an imbalance with favored law-abiding states.

Generally, states have been thrown into chaos in the post-Cold War period for three main reasons:

- The failure of democratic experiments (Angola, Haiti, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia)
- The reemergence of long-standing clan, tribal and ethnic conflicts (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Liberia, Sudan, Yugoslavia)
- The collapse of autocratic regimes (Albania, Zaire)¹⁷

Security Council Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991 marked a significant change in the practice of humanitarian intervention. It extended Article 39, Chapter VII of the Charter. Only the UN can impose sanctions on a country that violates human rights. In practice they were used in Iraqi and in Somalia.¹⁸

Collective security was built on three assumptions:

- the identity of the aggressor had to be apparent
- all states had to be interested in stopping aggression
- as with the balance of power, an alliance was presumed to be the best method of precluding aggression¹⁹

After that the UN has to make a solution: which device to use to solve the conflict, how to organize the PO and which non-military organizations should participated in the conflict solution.

CONDITIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY

If POs have be developed, they must be designated for success. To use MF in PO only *because it is necessary to do something* is inappropriate. Unfortunately, we have recent examples of this happening in our history, which resulted in the failure of the PO.

When the POs are considered, the followed basic questions must be answered:

- Does the international community wish to be impartial?
- Do the parties trust each other and the international community?
- Does the international community expect force to be used?
- Do all major parties to the conflict consent to the presence of the international community?²⁰

When all basic questions are positively answered, the PO consideration process can be started. In this process the following factors have to be considered and defined.

- The analysis of the conflict.
- Goals, missions and objectives.
- Decision making.
- Force structuring.
- Force command and authority.²¹

Additional difficult problems are financing of PO, logistic support of units, doctrine, unit cohesion, chain of command, language, climate, cultural and religious diversity.

There are three risks for *humanitarian intervention*. Historical precedent; reinforcing existing power relations in the international system; and intent and motive, which may be well nigh impossible to ascertain

Historically, *humanitarian aid* was used to describe different doubtful actions. Humanitarian intervention should only be sanctioned under the following conditions:

- there is a provable and immediate violation of human rights
- all other recourse beneath the level of intervention has been exhausted
- such violations are extensive and pose a threat of the widespread loss of life
- any use of force should be proportional whereby it protects those engaged but aims to cause minimum disruption or disturbance to other values aside from human rights
- any intervention should be for the shortest possible period
- humanitarian intervention should generally take place under Chapter VII procedures
- intervention should, where possible, involve some form of consent from the host state²²

It solves the momentary need of people but no long term stability. The state remains sovereign and independent.

It is of paramount importance that humanitarian intervention takes place only as an expression of the collective will of the international community. This is especially important in order to avoid charges of neocolonialism, of religious persecution or the impression that western values are being imposed on other parts of the world.

Humanitarian intervention employing military force may be used in the following ways:

- ground forces may be employed to protect relief workers and to ensure that essential supplies reach those whose lives are endangered by denial of basic sustenance
- air and naval forces can also be used to enforce blockades or no-fly zones with the aim of protecting relief workers and innocent civilians from attack by hostile parties
- the employment of military logistical capabilities to help deliver essential supplies either in a combat zone where civilians are trapped or in the aftermath of a natural disaster²³

Conditions for employing a developed MF:

- any forces assembled for the purpose of humanitarian intervention should be under UN command and control
- authority to act will depend entirely upon the collective will of the international community
- evidence of human rights abuses shall be assembled, or corroborated, by UN sources
- standard operating procedures are agreed upon and followed in each and every instance
- independence forces humanitarian intervention realized²⁴

PK has always been considered to have four essential non-forceful aspects required to function:

- acceptance by the security council, the countries concerned with the conflict, and the contributing states
- cooperation by all the parties concerned
- an unambiguous and realistic mandate
- international political necessity²⁵

The use of force in PK has never been a major factor. The political character of PK is paramount. Before the PO is developed, it must be considered and six operational problems that can seriously influence the success of PO must to be solved. They are:

- language
- doctrine
- unit cohesion
- chain of command
- force composition
- continued viability²⁶

PKF should perhaps only be used when:

- the primary protagonist requests a PKF
- the area of deployment and the population of the areas controlled by the respective parties do not include a large number of citizens of the opposite national group
- there is an finite line of demarcation between the warring parties²⁷

SITUATION IN THE AREA OF INTEREST:

In the time of consideration of PO, it is important to remember the fact that the PO is for the region which is in trouble. This requires correctly and quickly evaluating the situation to influence all other decision making processes. This means determining which kind of operation is proper to develop. If PO is proper for this situation, the decision making process should continue. How do we determine which kind of PO to develop?

The task of developed MF is not to solve the regional problem but create conditions for political negotiations. Political agreement is the key for solution.

It needs to be considered in the following way:

Locus of deployment. The influence of terrain on force development, area size, density of population, character of terrain, protection of units and anti air defense. We have to use advantages of terrain for assignment of tasks and protection of units.

The political and military content. The kind of dispute should determine the kind of operation, its extent and kind of MF used, and range of dispute. Is it interstate or international?

What about the host state's and other primary disputant's behavior? Belligerent's site behavior? Evaluation of PO, according to their success, shows that cooperation of belligerents is necessary for success of PKO.

Third party states. The posture of third states seriously influences the development and running of the PO. If some third state takes sides with one of the states in conflict it threatens to escalate the conflict. Third states have little possibilities to positively influence the conflict. Their best role is to remain neutral.

Sub-national actors. Small groups, which are interested in the state or territory, can seriously influence the situation. They are often more powerful than government forces. They can be located in more than one state, and can have military components. Third states could be interested and involved through these groups.

Local military forces. What is their size, armament and equipment, moral condition, their position and interest in dispute? Additional factors include knowledge of local history, cultures, religious, languages, relations between populations, standard of living, customs, etc.

These are only basic and crucial factors.

National leaders have to articulate a vision of what they want and need to achieve.

SITUATION IN THE STATES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE OPERATIONS

To evaluate conditions for PO it is necessary to appraise the situation and conditions in states, which should contribute to the PO. The first precondition is the willingness of the state to involve its MF in the area of conflict. It depends on public opinion, political and economical condition, position of the MF in the society and MF mission. It also depends on the interest in an area of dispute, if the shape of MF is proper and able for this task, on financial conditions, on membership in pacts, etc. It is not my purpose to enumerate all conditions here. Because it is not possible, due to the unique circumstances of every situation. Every factor has a different weight. It shows only the number of considered factors and how complicated and demanding the decision making process is.

The essential requirement is the statement of the vision. Research has shown that people, organizations and nations with a clear and positive vision of their futures achieve success where others fail. National leaders alone can articulate a vision that not only captures the imagination of their public, but

also reassures them that their national interests will be advanced. It facilitates and motivates the decision-making process.

The US has identified its national interests in PKO formulation:

- 1. As such, in order to generate support for PKOs of any kind, the administration needs to articulate to Congress, the public and the key and influential European allies a vision of how that operation will promote the national interest while serving worthy objectives.
- Secondly, it will need to accept that American presence overseas plays a system stabilizing function – one it can share with but not abdicate to the United Nations.²⁸

Unfortunately most countries do not have their national interests in PKO formulated. It seriously complicated the situation between the UN and these countries.

PREPARATION FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

STATESMEN AND MILITARY FORCE COOPERATION

A number of considerations indicate how complicated and demanding crisis resolution is. But we do not have another mechanism. Today's imperative is to improve and make this process effective and faster.

Statesmen and military leaders both contribute during PO preparations. It could be the first issue. Using MF does not have to be proper for solving the situation. Political will and intent does not always match the size, structure, condition and readiness MF for the required task. Differences between political promises and the real possibilities of using MF can complicate PO. It calls for mutual respect and confidence. Usually the MF are not able immediately to develop PO in the area of interest. Every MF has a different readiness system. Since the end of the Cold War more MF have their own systems, how they have to set off and prepare demanded forces for a PO.

This requires detailed planning when PO are considered and prepared. UN demands and the intrastate situation and circumstances both need to be taken into account together in PO preparation.

Every PO is managed by political, not military leadership. Usually more than two countries participate in PO. It requires clearly formulating the chain of command, areas of responsibility and authority, and financial and especially logistical support and coordination. Planning must include non-military organizations participating on the PO.

MILITARY PREPARATION

Military force preparation for the PO is an indispensable requirement. The level of a unit's preparation influences its abilities. Not every good combat force became a good peacekeeper or peacemaker. The units implemented great part of political agreements. It means that conditions created for preparation of the units have to be corresponding to the PO mission. Only well prepared units are able to fulfill the PO tasks. We cannot use a universal model because:

- the preparation of every MF resulted from different situations and conditions
- each PO is unique and requires different tasks due to different situation and conditions

Phased-developed approach

Phase I

- collection and analysis of information
- coordination of possibilities
- reconnaissance of new areas for UN units

Phase II

- general work with regional structures (NATO, ..)
- standardization, doctrine creation
- procedure creation, technology using, connection
- logistic support
- rules of engagement
- operational coordination²⁹

The commander and staff preparation includes theoretical and psychological training. Accurate knowledge of tasks, conditions and relations is a precondition for identifying tasks. The knowledge of the rules of engagement is necessary for successful operations. In developing ROE, it is critical that the planners consider any service-specific core training in ROE that the combat forces may have received prior to deployment. Training all personnel on situations likely to be encountered during the operation is important in the understanding of ROE. Unit's preparation includes theoretical, psychological and practical training. It calls for time for general preparation and special preparation. Special preparation is needed for all MF. The extent of general preparation depends on level of professionalism, readiness and training the MF. Politicians have to look at this time. Generally it takes from three to six months to prepare MF for PO.

EXPERIENCE FROM PEACE OPERATIONS

GENERAL

The number of PKO that were carried out during the period of the Cold War provide sufficient experiences and information to evaluate them and generalize conditions which cause success or failure in the operations. But it does not necessarily mean that when all conditions for successful PKO are created the PKO will be successful. It is premature to generally evaluate PO which are not PKO. There are not a sufficient number of finished comparable operations to evaluate them reliable. Because PM usually preludes PK, it is possible to exploit PKO experiences. Results of PMO created initiatory conditions for PKO. PO in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example where PMO created conditions for PKO.

Peacekeeping missions have their own natural histories, and the overall long term success or failure of a peacekeeping mission is largely determined by the ability of peacekeepers to contain specific conflict events as they unfold. If we use data based upon available historical record we can evaluate PKO that were discussed.

From assessed operations were 50 approved and 50 denied.

- 42 only observers or patrols.
- 17 local public support
- .18 disapproved because of less budget
- 7 not used force because of counterattack
- 8 approved but not carried out30

Analysis of PKO can be made according to their impact of different conditions on PO success. We can consider the conditions under which this success was achieved.

Peacekeeping Event Success and Failure under Varying Conditions of Disputant Self-Deterrence:

| control of conflict | violence certain | violence probable | violence uncertain | nonviolence probable |
|---------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| successful | 9 (32,1 %) | 6 (26,1 %) | 24 (63,2 %) | 11 (100 %) |
| failure | 19 (67,9 %) | 17 (73,9 %) | 14 (36,8 %) | 0 (0 %) |
| total | 28 | 23 | 38 | 11 |

Among the 28 events in which violence was regarded as certain, legitimacy was low in most cases, but there was a significantly greater likelihood of conflict control success in the few cases where legitimacy was high than when it was low. Success at conflict control was more strongly associated with level of force than with legitimacy under these conditions.³¹

Impact of Level of Legitimacy and Level of Force on Success of Conflict Control under Conditions of Certain Violence:

| | level of legitimacy | level of legitimacy | level of force | level of force | level of force |
|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| conflict control | strong or | ambivalent or | patrol | meditation | force |
| | conditional | critical | | | |
| successful | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 6 |
| failure | 1 | 18 | 15 | 2 | 2 |
| total | 5 | 23 | 16 | 4 | 8 |

Our expectations received more support among those events in which we had regarded violence as probable but not certain.³²

Impact of Level of Legitimacy and Level of Force on Success of Conflict Control under Conditions of Probable Violence:

| • | level of legitimacy | level of legitimacy | level of force | level of force | level of force |
|------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| conflict control | strong or conditional | ambivalent or critical | patrol | meditation | force |
| successful | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| not successful | 0 | 17 | 14 | 2 | 1 |
| total | 5 | 18 | 16 | 6 | 1 |

In these cases, PK legitimacy was strongly associated with conflict control success and the relationship between use of force and PK success was considerably weaker.³³

Impact of Level of Legitimacy and Level of Force on Success of Conflict Control under Conditions of Uncertain Violence:

| | level of legitimacy | level of legitimacy | level of force | level of force | level of force |
|------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| conflict control | strong or conditional | ambivalent or critical | patrol | meditation | force |
| successful | 18 | 6 | 3 | 15 | 6 |
| failure | 1 | 13 | 10 | 3 | 1 . |
| total | 19 | 19 | 13 | 18 | 78 |

Success at conflict control was strongly related to PK legitimacy under these conditions as well. The association between legitimacy and PK success was higher than between use of force and success. Patrolling had been a relatively ineffective PK tool under conditions of violence certainly and violence probability as well. 34

All these evaluated PKO are from the period of the Cold War. Strong impact had superpower's position and support, their ideological interest etc. It means that these conclusions are not fully valid for contemporary conditions. Nevertheless we can use these experience as a theoretical source for PO organization in future.

EXPERIENCE FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A number of political and economical problems in former Yugoslavia were detachedly evaluated. Especially their reasons were not searched in new world conditions and new conditions for Yugoslavia. Politicians abused inhabitants' national filing, historically inextricable national and regional relationships, unfortunate experiences from World War II inclusive. Consequence was bloody conflict with ethnic cleansing that accompanied the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.

The map of IFOR/SFOR units' development in Bosnia and Herzegovina.



The UN effort was focussed on preventing the continuation of the conflict. The result was PKO development. Without question this operation lowered the intensity of conflict and saved many lives. Ultimately it was a failure because it did not create permanent peace. Why? We can make an evaluation using preconditions for successful PKO.

The first step is to define the conditions that are necessary for success in MOOTW:

 The international community (the UN and/or regional organization) believes the conflict to justify intervention, and is willing to take the risk of introducing military forces and to bear the cost.

Reality: The international community believes that the consequence of PKO will be peace. The first precondition was realized.

- 2. A plausible political settlement to the dispute exists and could be defined in general terms. Reality: The PKO only lowered violence, but disputants did not achieve their goals and were not willing to stop the conflict, only change its form. Political settlement did not exist. They did not have sufficient of political willing to consolidate the situation and no one side had real interest to sign the agreement. The second precondition was not realized.
- The parties to the conflict are prepared to stop fighting and accept outside help in moving toward a political settlement – in traditional PO.

Reality: Parties in conflict were not prepared to stop fighting. They accepted outside help only sporadically and to recover their army's previous capability. The third precondition was not realized.

4. The international community is essentially neutral as to how the dispute should be resolved, and this is apparent to the warring parties.

Reality: The international community was not fully neutral.

5. MF has a role that is relevant to achieving to political settlement, e.g., as a truce, monitors, patrols in demilitarized zones, etc.

Reality: The disputant parties wanted to continue to solve the situation by force. UN military forces did not have the mandate and tools to stop violence and to create conditions for negotiations. The position of UN forces was not relevant to achieving a political settlement.

Evaluating these preconditions for success of the PKO, it is obvious that this PKO did not have a chance to succeed. But it was not correct to assert that UN PKO was redundant. This PKO lowered intensity of conflict and saved a great number of human lives. In the context of civil war, Bosnia provided an important lesson for future UN PK efforts:

- The instability inherent in civil war makes a purely humanitarian response inadequate, impractical, and dangerous.
- There is a need to coordinate and to the extent possible integrate all components of a UN
 operations in a complex emergency, the political, the security, and the humanitarian effort.
- In certain situations the security matter in such that protection is required for humanitarian action. Delete security, and the humanitarian aid does not reach those in need. Suffering increases, violence escalates, and the crisis is exacerbated.
- Command and control structures must be transparent and effective. The success of a PKO is to large degree dependent on unity and cohesion within the mission itself.
- Involving PK in civil war situations is that enforcement action under Chapter Seven of the Charter that can not be undertaken without the full commitment of all involved.
- If in Somalia the UN was perceived as too aggressive then in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is roundly criticized for being much too passive.³⁶

The following elements have been identified as especially important:

- The mandates of each operation must be defined precisely with clear political objectives.
- Mandates, once agreed upon, must be translated into clearly defined operational objectives, including phases or time frames, where appropriate.
- There must be a provision for regular assessment of ongoing operations, including reviewing the scope of their continued existence.
- The Security Council should, on a regular basis, assess operational activities to ensure that action taken on the ground is at all times consistent with the agreed political objectives and that the mandates and operational plans are on course.
- Measures must be taken to improve and ensure protection and safety of personnel involved in UN operations.
- There is a need to elaborate more precisely the rules of engagement for PK forces including the right to self-defense and the use of force for protection of UN personnel.
- There is a need to ensure that the countries contributing troops are briefed on a regular basis and consulted before any changes are made in existing mandates, which could have an impact on their troops.
- The Security Council should be provided with comprehensive and realistic assessment of the resources available for carrying out resolutions and the time-frame within which such resources can be provided before the Council moves to adopt the resolution in question in final form. This will go a long way to avoid unrealistic expectations and frustration.³⁷

The different situation developed after the Dayton Agreement. The UN used the preceding mission's experiences and considered carefully its weaknesses for which it was criticized. Why was the Dayton Agreement ratified? To agree with peace was advantageous for all disputants in that situation. The Serbian side had 49% of Bosnians' territory and their military capabilities were depleted after NATO strikes. The Croatian side completed operation "Oluja" meaning "Storm", and had part of Bosnian territory for the Croatian population. The Muslim side had for the first time in history, its own territory in Bosnia and the agreement gave them a chance for movement across all of Bosnian territory. These were the main reasons to ratify the agreement.

A second task was to implement the DA. The situation called for a strong and capable MF that would be able to enforce the agreement. Distrust between the belligerents was high and could destroy the entire peace process. A MF called IFOR was deployed almost immediately after DA was ratified. All preconditions for success of PO were fulfilled. But success of the IFOR operation did not come automatically. Prolonged distrust between belligerents and their attempts to abuse the situation and to avoid the conditions of DA called for a strong force to supervise this peace process. This force had to be able not only to verify the demobilization process and the movement of heavy weapons to the declared

storage areas but also to effectively use the force to fulfil DA. The threat of use of forces was a very effective tool to protect the peace, and deterred the former belligerent's armies.

Unfortunately the DA was not perfect and had weaknesses, which negatively influenced the following period. Generally, the IFOR mission was very successful, but just these weaknesses negatively complicated IFOR effectiveness in the political sphere.

The main problems of the Dayton Agreement were:

- 1. Unrealistic timing, especially with respect to NATO's exit strategy and the election schedule.
- 2. Conflicting objectives of integration versus partition.
- 3. Tension between the agreement's arms control provisions and the U.S. promise to arm and the federation armies.
- 4. A lack of coordination between the military and civilian aspects of the agreement.

Additional problems of the mission included:

- 5. Economic aid distribution.
- 6. Refugees problems solution.
- 7. Mission to capture and arrest war criminals did not solidify.
- 8. IPTF organization, armament, authority and responsibility.
- 9. Freedom of movement.
- 10. De-mining process.

The time between ratification of the Dayton Agreement and time of implementation was extremely short. The IFOR, based on the NATO forces, was not able immediately to fully deploy. Here we can see a problem between military leaders and politicians. Statesmen did not estimate the military force abilities and did not cooperate with the military professionals. This mistake could have had immense consequences. Initial forces were not powerful enough in the first phase of the mission. Every engagement of peace forces could have caused a blood conflict in which local forces had strong advantages. Fortunately, according to local climate the winter period is inappropriate to start a conflict. The significant roles played local armies situation and momentary political willing to achieve peace.

Also the term of elections were determined too early to create all democratic conditions for their organization and fulfillment. The consequence was conduction only parliament elections during the planned term. Local elections were postponed.

Disproportion was probably the most obvious weaknesses of the DA. It influenced not only the political situation and conditions for negotiations but also public opinion and conditions for IFOR mission accomplishment. On one hand they wanted to integrate all former belligerents into one federation; on the other hand they had a different approach to each side and created different positions of these sides in the federation. The consequence was failure of the federation. In fact, it defied the principle of neutrality. A more serious problem was the program to equip and train Croatian and Muslim armies and created

disproportional approach was in economic aid distribution. In an official report it was announced that 98 % of economic aid was delivered to the Muslim and Croatian sides and only 2 % to Serbian side. It confirmed to the Serbian population a sense of injustice and wrong and complicated all negotiations and conditions for IFOR mission accomplishment. Political extremists abused this situation and influenced public opinion support not due to their popularity but because of apprehension and revolt, regardless of the fact that they were war criminals. Some Muslim representatives thought that only they were victims of the conflict and all support should be for them and deployed forces should serve them. A situation like this was not favorable for the implementation all DA and for the peace mission.

The tasks defined in the DA were relatively clear. The mistake was that responsibilities were insufficiently defined. IFOR was the most famous component and it was felt that any success or failure of the operation was their responsibility. But not all tasks were fulfilled by IFOR, not for all tasks were assigned to MF proper and not all tasks were able to be fulfilled. After IFOR successfully finished their military tasks, we could see attempts to extend their tasks and delegate some non-military tasks to IFOR, especially the International Police Task Force's tasks. IPTF had a huge responsibility to monitor local police activity. Local police were powerful organizations, which influenced public and political life. A lot of former soldiers served in the police which was inadequately armed and had broad jurisdiction. IFOR supported IPTF especially in the difficult tasks as an armament confiscation. IPTF did not have sufficient personnel, it was under armed and it did not have such adequate authority. In fact, local polices were under political control, served political goals and were outside of international force control. Insufficient control of the local police by international forces was serious mistake, which had an impact in several areas. Include capturing and arresting war criminals. Some of police members were war criminals. So the mission to capture and arrest war criminals was not concretized. Missions for IFOR were general and only marginal. But the problem that the war criminals are not captured was connected with IFOR. We can say that efforts were not coordinated well and caused them to be ineffective.

Another serious problem has been refugees. Thousands of displaced homeless civilians who were temporarily dislocated in Bosnia became a significant social problem. One part of refuges problem was created by consequences of Bosnian war and the second part of refugees was created by consequences of Croatian operation "Oluja". This issue has been connected with freedom of movement issue. A lot of statesmen spoke about this problem but no one had a concrete idea how to solve it. The idea to return refugees to the original homes is highly moral and it is aimed against consequences of ethnic cleansing. War suffering created hatred. A great many people desired to come back to their homes or to their former area and to build new houses. A great number of local people agreed with the return of refugees and they wanted to tolerate former multi ethnic ordering in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was danger that extremists who led and supported the war, could threaten returning refugees and unleash new violence. Who was responsible to guarantee the security of returnees? The first answer used to be: "IFOR after SFOR". But it is police work and SFOR did not have tools and authority to guarantee all the returnee's

security. This security should be guaranteed by local police. But their members often organized violence and took part in violence. And the IPTF did not have enough power and authority to force them to solve the refugees' security problem.

Last but not least was the problem with the de-mining process. It was and still is a problem for the entire country and for the next generation. Local armies were responsible for de-mining their own country and IFOR engineers had to supervise the de-mining process. Reality was different. In the first period, local armies de-mined the most important places. But after that they de-mobilized engineer units. Finally, they called for outside help with de-mining. At first, they wished for help from IFOR units. Later de-mobilized engineers established civilian companies that executed de-mining and they call for financing these organizations. They tried to delegate their own obligations and responsibilities to the international organizations.

These are the many, but not all issues of the IFOR/SFOR mission. Some problems were not deeply thought through and local parties ably abused these weaknesses. The DA and the IFOR mission have unquestionably had a positive impact and have ensured peace in the region after a long bloody war. But we have to define problems and their reasons in order to avoid them in POs in future.

CONCLUSION

Human efforts to secure peace will be different in the future and will have to solve new and complicated issues. This calls for the reorganization not only of the UN but also of the whole security mechanism. We have enough information and experiences to make correct conclusions.

We will have to transform forces which serve under the UN flag. They will have to be more flexible and ready to fulfil special PO tasks. This will have an impact on training, equipment, education and thinking. It is a political question for the states that contribute their forces in PO. The growing number of simultaneous operations calls for competent delegation of authority to lower organizations. The UN would not be able direct all operations concurrently. This requires better coordination, better relations and better team work.

We have to prepare people for future potential and prospective operations. But we do not have to limit this task only to the military force's preparation. It is also necessary to prepare contributing and participating civilian organizations. As well, a primary mission is to prepare a sufficient number of advisers and qualified directive structures. The gap is in cooperation between civil and military leaders. Improving cooperation and relations between them can improve the effectiveness of future peace missions.

World realities are developing very quickly, especially in the post-Cold War period. PO development must be as fast as the development of world crises. Preparation and organization of peace operations call for a reliable doctrinal base. It means unified decision making process, managed mechanisms, terms etc. It is a task not only for the UN but also for local organizations, members of UN and all democratic states of the world. It is a great challenge for the future.³⁸

8528 words !!!

ENDNOTES

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